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The new International Health Regulations adopted by
the World Health Assembly in May 2005 (IHR 2005) repre-
sents a major development in the use of international law
for public health purposes. One of the most important
aspects of IHR 2005 is the establishment of a global sur-
veillance system for public health emergencies of interna-
tional concern. This article assesses the surveillance
system in IHR 2005 by applying well-established frame-
works for evaluating public health surveillance. The
assessment shows that IHR 2005 constitutes a major
advance in global surveillance from what has prevailed in
the past. Effectively implementing the IHR 2005 surveil-
lance objectives requires surmounting technical, resource,
governance, legal, and political obstacles. Although IHR
2005 contains some provisions that directly address these
obstacles, active support by the World Health Organization
and its member states is required to strengthen national
and global surveillance capabilities.
O
n May 23, 2005, the World Health Assembly adopted
the new International Health Regulations (IHR 2005)
(1) as an international treaty. This step concluded the
decade-long effort led by the World Health Organization
(WHO) to revise the old regulations (IHR 1969) to make
them more effective against global disease threats.
Originally adopted in 1951 (2) and last substantially
changed in 1969 (3), IHR 1969 had lost its effectiveness
and relevance by the mid-1990s, if not earlier (4).
The resurgence of infectious diseases noted in the first
half of the 1990s showed IHR 1969’s limitations. For
example, after smallpox was eradicated in the late 1970s,
IHR 1969 only applied to the traditionally “quarantinable”
diseases of cholera, plague, and yellow fever. In addition,
IHR 1969 restricted surveillance to information provided
only by governments, lacked mechanisms for swiftly
assessing and investigating public health risks, contained
no strategies for developing surveillance capacities and
infrastructure, and failed to generate compliance by WHO
member states. WHO began revising IHR 1969 in 1995
(5), and IHR 2005’s adoption completed the modernization
of this important body of international law on public
health.
IHR 2005 departs radically from IHR 1969 and repre-
sents a historic development in international law on public
health (6). IHR 2005 expands the scope of the regulations’
application, strengthens WHO’s authority in surveillance
and response, contains more demanding surveillance and
response obligations, and applies human rights principles
to public health interventions. The most dramatic of these
changes involves a new surveillance system that far sur-
passes what the IHR 1969 contained. After reviewing key
surveillance concepts and frameworks, this article
describes IHR 2005’s surveillance regime and assesses its
likely performance. It concludes by discussing obstacles
that could prevent IHR 2005 from becoming an effective
global public health surveillance system and addressing
how these obstacles might be overcome.
Key Surveillance Concepts 
and Evaluation Framework
Public health surveillance has been defined as “the
ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation
of outcome-specific data for use in the planning, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of public health practice” (7). A
surveillance system requires structures and processes to
support these ongoing functions (7).
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
developed guidelines that identify the essential elements
and attributes for an effective public health surveillance
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veillance systems involves 2 main steps: 1) describing the
purpose, operation, and elements of the system and 2)
assessing its performance according to key attributes. This
article uses this 2-step approach to evaluate the global pub-
lic health surveillance system prescribed by IHR 2005.
Surveillance System Specified in IHR 2005
In the CDC framework, describing a surveillance sys-
tem includes 4 main elements: 1) health-related events
under surveillance and their public health importance, 2)
purpose and objectives of the system, 3) components and
processes of the system, and 4) resources needed to oper-
ate it (8).
Health-related Events under Surveillance
IHR 2005 identifies health-related events that each
country that agrees to be bound by the regulations (a “state
party”) must report to WHO. In terms of health-related
events that occur in its territory, a state party must notify
WHO of “all events which may constitute a public health
emergency of international concern” (article 6.1). These
events include any unexpected or unusual public health
event regardless of its origin or source (article 7). IHR
2005 also requires state parties, as far as is practicable, to
inform WHO of public health risks identified outside their
territories that may cause international disease spread, as
manifested by exported or imported human cases, vectors
that may carry infection or contamination, or contaminat-
ed goods (article 9.2).
IHR 2005 provides guidance to assist state parties’
compliance with these obligations in 4 ways. First, IHR
2005 defines a “public health emergency of international
concern” (PHEIC) as “an extraordinary event which is
determined [by the WHO Director-General]… (i) to con-
stitute a public health risk to other States through the inter-
national spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a
coordinated international response” (article 1.1). Unlike
IHR 1969’s limited scope of application to just 3 commu-
nicable diseases (3), IHR 2005 defines disease as an illness
or medical condition that does or could threaten human
health regardless of its source or origin (article 1.1). This
scope therefore encompasses communicable and noncom-
municable disease events, whether naturally occurring,
accidentally caused, or intentionally created.
Second, IHR 2005 contains a “decision instrument”
(annex 2) that helps state parties identify whether a health-
related event may constitute a PHEIC and therefore
requires formal notification to WHO (Figure 1). The deci-
sion instrument focuses on risk assessment criteria of pub-
lic health importance, including the seriousness of the
public health impact and the likelihood of international
spread.
Third, IHR 2005 includes a list of diseases for which a
single case may constitute a PHEIC and must be reported
to WHO immediately. This list consists of smallpox,
poliomyelitis, human influenza caused by new subtypes,
and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). A second
list of diseases exists (Figure 1) for which a single case
requires the decision instrument to be used to assess the
event, but notification is determined by the assessment and
is not automatic. Finally, IHR 2005 also encourages state
parties to consult with WHO over events that do not meet
the criteria for formal notification but may still be of pub-
lic health relevance (article 8).
IHR 2005’s expansion of the range of public health
events under surveillance and the use of risk assessment
criteria in deciding what is reportable is possibly the single
most important surveillance advance in IHR 2005. This
change greatly enhances effective surveillance of emerg-
ing infectious diseases, which are “infections that have
newly appeared in a population or have existed but are rap-
idly increasing in incidence or geographic range” (9). IHR
2005’s surveillance strategy, especially the decision instru-
ment, has been specifically designed to make IHR 2005
directly applicable to emerging infectious disease events,
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Figure 1. International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 decision
instrument (simplified from annex 2 of IHR).which are usually unexpected and often threaten to spread
internationally.
In addition to events that may constitute a PHEIC, IHR
2005 also requires state parties to report the health meas-
ures (e.g., border screening, quarantine) that they imple-
ment in response to such events (article 6). State parties
are also specifically required to inform WHO within 48
hours of implementing additional health measures that
interfere with international trade and travel, unless the
WHO Director-General has recommended such measures
(article 43).
Purpose and Objectives of Surveillance 
under IHR 2005
IHR 2005’s purpose is to prevent, protect against, con-
trol, and facilitate public health responses to the interna-
tional spread of disease (article 2), and IHR 2005 makes
surveillance central to guiding effective public health
action against cross-border disease threats. The regulations
define surveillance as “the systematic ongoing collection,
collation and analysis of data for public health purposes
and the timely dissemination of public health information
for assessment and public health response as necessary”
(article 1.1). Surveillance is central to IHR 2005’s public
health objectives, which explains why IHR 2005 requires
all state parties to develop, strengthen, and maintain core
surveillance capacities (article 5.1). This obligation goes
beyond anything concerning surveillance in IHR 1969,
which did not address surveillance infrastructure and capa-
bilities beyond a general requirement for a state party to
notify WHO of any outbreak of a disease subject to the
regulations.
Components and Processes of IHR 2005 Surveillance
IHR 2005 describes key aspects of the surveillance
process from the local to the global level. As part of IHR
2005’s core surveillance and response capacity require-
ments, each state party has to develop and maintain capa-
bilities to detect, assess, and report disease events at the
local, intermediate, and national levels (article 5.1, annex
1). Officials at the national level must be able to report
through the national IHR focal point to WHO when
required under IHR 2005 (articles 4.2 and 6). The regula-
tions also mandate that WHO establish IHR contact points
that are always accessible to state parties (article 4.3).
Connecting these levels produces the surveillance archi-
tecture illustrated in Figure 2.
Requiring that a national IHR focal point be established
is another surveillance initiative in IHR 2005. The focal
point is designed to facilitate rapid sharing of surveillance
information because it is responsible for communicating
with the WHO IHR contact points and disseminating infor-
mation within the state party (article 4.2). By linking
national IHR focal points through WHO, IHR 2005 estab-
lishes a global network that improves the real-time flow of
surveillance information from the local to the global level
and also between state parties (article 4.4).
Resources Needed to Operate IHR 2005’s 
Surveillance System
Building and maintaining the surveillance system envi-
sioned in IHR 2005 will require substantial financial and
technical resources. State parties will be primarily respon-
sible for providing resources needed to develop their core
surveillance capacities. Each state party has to assess its
ability to meet the core surveillance requirements by June
2009. In addition, each state party has to develop and
implement a plan for ensuring compliance with core sur-
veillance obligations (articles 5.1 and 5.2, annex 1).
WHO is obliged to assist state parties in meeting their
surveillance system obligations (article 5.3), but this provi-
sion does not allocate any WHO funds for this purpose.
State parties are required to collaborate with each other in
providing technical cooperation and logistical support for
surveillance capabilities and in mobilizing financial
resources to facilitate implementation of IHR 2005 (article
44.1).
Evaluating the IHR 2005 Surveillance System’s
Attributes and Potential Performance
Key attributes of effective surveillance systems identi-
fied by CDC are usefulness, sensitivity, timeliness, stabil-
ity, simplicity, flexibility, acceptability, data quality,
positive predictive value, and representativeness. Of these
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Figure 2. Public health surveillance structures and processes
specified in International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005.attributes, usefulness, sensitivity, timeliness, and stability
will be most critical to the success of the IHR 2005 sur-
veillance system. Simplicity, acceptability, and flexibility
will affect the establishment and sustainability of the sur-
veillance system. Data quality, positive predictive value,
and representativeness are central to accurately character-
izing health-related events under surveillance. Table 1
summarizes these attributes, provides commentary on
their relevance to effective surveillance under IHR 2005,
and assesses the likely performance of the IHR 2005 sur-
veillance system for each attribute. The following para-
graphs concentrate on assessing IHR 2005 with respect to
the key attributes of usefulness, sensitivity, timeliness,
and stability.
Usefulness of the Surveillance System
The central premise of IHR 2005 is that rapidly detect-
ing PHEIC will support improved disease prevention and
control both within and between state parties. Ample evi-
dence shows that delayed recognition and response to
emerging diseases may result in adverse consequences in
terms of illness and death, spread to other countries, and
disruption of trade and travel (10). The usefulness of sur-
veillance under IHR 2005 represents the sum of all the crit-
ical system attributes and can only be assessed after the
system is in operation, so this attribute is not discussed
here. However, for the future sustainability and develop-
ment of IHR 2005, we must evaluate its overall usefulness
and document its contribution to prevention and control of
adverse health events. IHR includes mechanisms to review
and, if necessary, amend its provisions and in particular
requires periodic evaluation of the functioning of the deci-
sion instrument (article 54).
Sensitivity of the Surveillance System
The IHR 2005 surveillance provisions imply 100% sen-
sitivity as a standard, namely the reporting of all events
that meet notification requirements. The use of risk assess-
ment criteria (Figure 1) also allows for higher sensitivity
for PHEIC than would be possible with a list of predeter-
mined disease threats (as in IHR 1969). To test the poten-
tial sensitivity of the decision instrument proposed in
drafts of the revised IHR in 2004, investigators in the
United Kingdom applied the then-proposed decision
instrument to all events (N = 30) that were important
enough to have been published in the national surveillance
bulletin for England and Wales during 2003 (11).
According to this method, 12 of the 30 events would have
been reportable under the decision instrument. These
events included all those that were considered potential
PHEIC. Investigators concluded that the decision instru-
ment was highly sensitive for selecting outbreaks and inci-
dents that require reporting under the proposed IHR
revision.
The sensitivity of the IHR 2005 surveillance system
will probably be affected by 2 factors. First, in all likeli-
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levels within state parties will limit the system’s sensitivi-
ty more than capacities at the national level. Second, state
parties may not always be willing to comply with their
reporting obligations in the face of possible adverse polit-
ical and economic consequences that may result from
alerting the world to a disease event in their territories.
Fear of such adverse consequences undermined reporting
obligations in IHR 1969.
IHR 2005 incorporates strategies to address these
potential limitations. First, as noted above, IHR 2005
requires state parties to build and maintain core local,
intermediate, and national surveillance capabilities (article
5.1, annex 1). Fulfillment of this obligation will improve
surveillance capacity vertically, from local to national lev-
els, which should support higher sensitivity.
Second, IHR 2005 permits WHO to improve sensitivi-
ty by collecting and using information from multiple
sources. IHR 1969 only allowed WHO to use information
provided by state parties (3), and failure of state parties to
abide by their reporting obligations adversely affected
WHO surveillance activities (5). Under IHR 2005, WHO
can collect, analyze, and use information gathered from
governments, other intergovernmental organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations and actors (article 9.1). By
permitting WHO to cast its surveillance network beyond
information it receives from governments, IHR 2005 cre-
ates opportunities for WHO to improve the sensitivity of
the surveillance system and avoid being blocked by gov-
ernmental failure to comply with reporting requirements.
Timeliness of the Surveillance System
Public health practitioners understand how timely noti-
fication of public health risks is necessary for effective
intervention strategies (12,13), lessons reiterated in the
SARS pandemic (14). Timely surveillance is also stressed
in connection with strategies to deal with pandemic influen-
za (15,16). Timeliness may be the most important attribute
that IHR 2005 will have to demonstrate to be effective.
IHR 2005 contains several provisions that relate to time-
liness. National-level assessments with the decision instru-
ment must be completed within 48 hours (annex 1, part A,
6[a]). State parties must then notify WHO within 24 hours
of assessing any event that may constitute a PHEIC or that
is unexpected or unusual (articles 6.1 and 7). The same 24-
hour requirement applies to reporting public health risk out-
side a state party’s territory that may constitute a PHEIC
(article 9). State parties must also respond within 24 hours
to all requests that WHO makes for verification of health-
related events in their territories (article 10.2).
Timeliness of reporting is likely to be affected more by
actions taken at local and intermediate levels than national-
level provision of information to WHO. In this regard,
IHR 2005 includes the core surveillance capacity that
local and intermediate public health entities must be able
to carry out their reporting responsibilities immediately
(annex 1).
WHO’s ability to draw on a wide array of sources of
information, including the Internet and nongovernmental
organizations and actors, may enhance the timeliness of
the IHR 2005 surveillance system (13,17). In countries that
have less well-developed local, intermediate, and national
surveillance systems, nongovernmental sources of infor-
mation can often provide information faster than govern-
ments. Accessing this type of information early and often
helps WHO contact countries sooner, which increases the
chances of more effective interventions.
Stability of the Surveillance System
The obligations each state party has to build and main-
tain core capacities in surveillance at the local, intermedi-
ary, and national levels, combined with the responsibilities
for surveillance WHO has globally, should construct a
global surveillance system that will be stable and reliable
over time. Recognizing that core capacities at the national
level and below will not develop overnight, IHR 2005
gives state parties until June 2012 to develop these capac-
ities (article 5.1). State parties can obtain a 2-year exten-
sion on this deadline by submitting a justified need and an
implementation plan and can request an additional 2-year
extension, which the WHO Director-General has the dis-
cretion to approve or deny (article 5.2).
The 5-year grace period, and the possibility of 2-year
extensions, was a necessary compromise and reflects the
difficulties many developing states will have in improving
their surveillance systems. The stability and reliability of
the IHR 2005 surveillance system are designed to increase
steadily as the grace period and any extensions come to an
end.
Potential Obstacles to Achieving IHR 2005
Surveillance System Objectives
Continued lamentations about the weaknesses of public
health surveillance nationally and globally (18) illustrate
that achieving useful, sensitive, timely, and stable surveil-
lance through IHR 2005 will be a challenge for states and
the international community. Several potential obstacles,
including technical, resource, governance, legal, and polit-
ical concerns, will complicate and frustrate efforts to
improve national and global surveillance capabilities.
Table 2 summarizes these potential barriers and possible
responses.
Technical Issues
Emerging infectious diseases often create technical
challenges for surveillance, even for the most technologi-
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ity of surveillance systems for new pathogens has histori-
cally been limited, particularly if such pathogens presented
themselves in unusual or unexpected ways. Recent model-
ing has shown that the ability to control the spread of a
new pathogen is influenced by the proportion of transmis-
sion that occurs before the onset of overt symptoms or
through asymptomatic infection (19). This property
explains why diseases such as influenza and HIV may be
more difficult to control than smallpox or SARS.
Consequently, surveillance needs to be sufficiently sen-
sitive to detect infectious agents that have not yet resulted
in large numbers of diagnosed cases. One approach to this
challenge is syndromic surveillance (20), but such surveil-
lance has not been effective in detecting emerging infec-
tious diseases early (21). In fact, WHO abandoned
syndromic surveillance as a strategy for the revised IHR
after pilot studies demonstrated that it was not effective
(22). Improved diagnostic technologies may also help pub-
lic health authorities identify new pathogenic threats (23).
Strategies for enhancing reporting processes have been
well described (24).
Resource Issues
The demands of IHR 2005 surveillance obligations will
confront many countries, particularly developing coun-
tries, with resource challenges. IHR 2005 does not include
financing mechanisms, which leaves each state party to
bear the financial costs of improving its own local, inter-
mediate, and national level surveillance capabilities. The
obligation on state parties and WHO to collaborate in
mobilizing financial resources (article 44) is a weak obli-
gation at best. The lack of economic resources will, if not
more vigorously addressed as recommended by the UN
Secretary-General (25), retard progress on all aspects of
the upgraded surveillance system. WHO, in conjunction
with the United Nations and the World Bank, could consid-
er developing a global strategy to support the development
and maintenance of core surveillance capacities.
Governance Issues
Governance obstacles include managerial and adminis-
trative weaknesses in countries from the local to the
national level. Few countries have conducted a systematic
review of their surveillance systems, and thus most lack
detailed knowledge of gaps and limitations in their surveil-
lance infrastructures and how to address these problems
(26). Only a few states have assessed their ability to detect
and respond to emerging disease threats, such as those
posed by bioterrorism agents (27). The IHR 2005 require-
ment that each state party assess the condition of its public
health surveillance within 2 years of the regulations’entry
into force should help countries improve their national
governance for surveillance purposes. Again, many states
will need external assistance with such work.
Legal Issues
State parties may face legal complications in imple-
menting IHR 2005 within their national legal and constitu-
tional systems. For example, the United States has
indicated that requirements of US federalism may affect its
compliance with IHR 2005 (28). The US position suggests
that other countries may also wish to formulate reserva-
tions to IHR 2005 to account for the demands of their
national constitutional structures and systems of law (29).
Whether such reservations will undermine the IHR 2005
surveillance system cannot be assessed, but this concern
has to be monitored closely as countries determine whether
reservations are required under their national constitution-
al systems. IHR 2005 also specifies that domestic legisla-
tion and administrative arrangements be adjusted fully
with IHR 2005 by June 2007, or by June 2008 after a
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59.3). Helping state parties update their public health law
may be technical assistance that industrialized countries
can provide.
Political Issues
Questions remain about the level of political commit-
ment countries will demonstrate in implementing IHR
2005. IHR 1969 suffered because state parties frequently
failed to report notifiable diseases and routinely applied
excessive trade and travel restrictions (4). The relevance of
such trade and travel concerns was most recently illustrat-
ed during the SARS pandemic through China’s initial fears
that disclosing the pandemic would harm its economy and
foreign trade (30,31). WHO’s access to nongovernmental
sources of surveillance information reduces the incentives
that state parties once had to hide disease events, as was
demonstrated during the SARS pandemic (32). In addition,
IHR 2005 includes provisions that require WHO to recom-
mend, and state parties to use, control measures that are no
more restrictive than necessary to achieve the desired level
of health protection (articles 17, 43). Uncertainty lingers,
however, as to whether these obligations will fare better in
terms of state party compliance than similar ones in IHR
1969.
Conclusion
Establishing effective global public health surveillance
is at the heart of IHR 2005. Evaluating the surveillance
system specified by IHR 2005 is necessary to understand
the potential for this new set of international legal rules to
contribute to global health governance. IHR 2005 pre-
scribes essential elements of a surveillance system and
seeks to achieve the critical attributes of usefulness, sensi-
tivity, timeliness, and stability. These features resonate
with other aspects of IHR 2005 that make it a seminal
development for global health governance. In May 2006,
the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution urging
WHO member states to comply immediately, on a volun-
tary basis, with IHR 2005 in light of the threat posed by
avian influenza (33).
The task of turning the IHR 2005 vision of an effective
global public health surveillance system into reality is
daunting. Of the obstacles complicating this challenge,
lack of financial resources to upgrade surveillance sys-
tems, especially in developing countries, will be the most
difficult to overcome. In IHR 2005, public health has been
given a governance regime unlike anything in the history
of international law on public health. Turning the blueprint
detailed in IHR 2005 into functional architecture that ben-
efits all is one of the great public health challenges of the
first decades of the 21st century.
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